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I. INTRODUCTION
Any discussion of the European Community's ("EC") recently
published Notice concerning the assessment of cooperative joint
* Partner, resident in the Brussels office of Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly, a US based
International Law Firm. This Article was prepared in April 1993 and does not purport to
take account of subsequent developments.
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ventures pursuant to Article 851 of the EEC Treaty (the "Joint
Venture Guidelines" or "JVG")* cannot avoid referring to EC Reg-
ulation No. 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between un-
dertakings (the "Merger Control Regulation" or the "MCR").
The MCR finally established the EC Commission's exclusive au-
thority4 to vet mergers having a "Community dimension ' 5 (subject
to review by the European Court of First Instance and, ultimately,
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, March 25, 1957, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, 47 (hereinafter EEC Treaty). Article 85 of the EEC Treaty concerns agreements which
have the object or effect of restricting competition (see further Section III, infra) , whereas
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty concerns abuse of a dominant position by a company. Article
85 always requires at least two participating parties, whereas Article 86 behavior is most
frequently unilateral. However, there have been cases of so-called joint and collective domi-
nance: Italian Flat Glass, 1988 0. J. (L33) 44; on appeal Case T-68, 77 & 78/89, judgment of
March 10, 1992, not yet reported.
2. 1993 0. J. (C43)2.
3. Council Regulation on Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 1989 0. J.
(L395)(hereinafter MCR), as amended. The Regulation was adopted on December 21, 1989,
and came into force on September 21, 1990. The MCR is supplemented by implementing
rules which set forth the details of the time limits for notification, including the notification
Form CO (Commission Regulation 2367/90, 1990 0. J. (L219) 5), and Notices regarding (i)
restrictions ancillary to concentrations and (ii) concentrative and cooperative operations
(the "Concentrative JV Notice") 1990 0. J. (C203) 5, 10.
4. According to MCR Article 21(2) "No Member State shall apply its national legisla-
tion on competition to any concentration that has a Community dimension". The MCR has
effectively established a "one-stop-shop" for clearing qualifying mergers, thus avoiding the
costly and time consuming exercise of obtaining merger approvals in the individual EC
Member States. (It should be noted that certain Member State investment approvals will
still have to be sought by qualifying mergers, but these are not competition law type
approvals.).
5. Mergers will qualify as having a "Community dimension", and will therefore be sub-
ject to a priori notification and review, where the combined aggregate worldwide turnover
(after turnover-related taxes) of all the participating companies is greater than 5,000 million
ECU, and the aggregate EC-wide turnover of each of at least two of the participating com-
panies is more than 250 million ECU. Where the merger relates only to (a) part(s) of (a)
company(ies) , the threshold will be calculated by reference to the relevant part(s). These
thresholds are subject to review and modification by the end of 1993. However, mergers
between companies which realize two thirds or more of their aggregate EC-wide turnover in
the same Member State will not have a Community Dimension, and will therefore not be
subject to the Regulation (though they will remain subject to the relevant Member States'
national rules, if any). The thresholds are supposed to be reduced at the end of 1993, when
the operation of the MCR will be reviewed. The figure of 2 billion ECU has been mentioned,
but this is not definite. If this does happen, many more mergers will qualify for the one-
stop-shop clearance at EC level. However, there has been some tension in a number of cases
(e. g., Alcatel /AEG Kabel, 1992 0. J. (C6) 23 and Mannesman/Hoesch, Commission Press
Release IP/92/920 of November 12, 1992) where Member States felt that a particular case
should have been treated nationally, but the EC Commission refused (MCR Article 9 per-
mits referral back of appropriate cases for evaluation under national competition laws).
Under the circumstances, the Member States may not want the threshold to be reduced.
MCR Article 9 is also to be reviewed by the end of 1993. See further note 9, infra.
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the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")),6 and settled the long
standing debate about the so called "partial merger" theory.7 Arti-
cle 3(2), para. 2 of the MCR lays down that certain joint ventures
may indeed be "concentrative", and hence subject to the MCR.5
The successful operation of the MCR, and specifically the ability
of the Commission's Merger Task Force (part of Directorate Gen-
eral IV ("DG IV") responsible for competition generally) to respect
the tight deadlines9 for responding to the obligatory a priori notifi-
cations under the MCR, put the rest of DG IV under pressure to
streamline procedures for non-merger clearances. Traditionally,
the clearance for joint ventures under Article 8510 of the EEC
Treaty can take anywhere from twelve to twenty four months. Yet,
by the time the JVG were published, the Merger Task Force had
already completed approximately fifty concentrative joint venture
cases. The expedited procedures under the MCR caused the busi-
ness and legal community to demand similar procedures for the
notification and clearance of cooperative joint ventures.
The Commission reacted by dusting off its failed attempt in
6. The European Court of First Instance was created in November 1988 in order, inter
alia, to handle competition disputes on appeal from the EC Commission and thus speed up
the processing of cases. Decisions from the Court of First Instance (which became opera-
tional in November 1989) may be appealed to the ECJ on matters of law only.
7. Namely, could parties avoid the application of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty by es-
tablishing a joint venture which went beyond mere joint cooperation and was in reality a
merger of certain elements of the parties' business operations.
8. MCR, Art. 3(2), para. 2, states: "The creation of a joint venture performing on a
lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to
coordination of the competitive behavior of the parties amongst themselves or between
them and the joint venture, shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of para-
graph 1(b)".
9. Under the MCR, a merger must be notified within one week of the merger agreement
or takeover. The merger is automatically suspended until such notification takes place. The
Commission has a period of one month from the date of notification to determine whether
the merger does in fact fall within the scope of the MCR. However, where a Member State
requests the Commission to undertake an analysis relating to a distinct local market prob-
lem (under MCR Article 9), then this period of one month is extended to six weeks. If a
merger falling within the scope of the MCR creates or strengthens a dominant position
within the EC, the Commission must decide within the said one-month (or six-week) dead-
line whether the merger is compatible with the MCR, or to initiate proceedings (to deter-
mine after a more detailed review the compatibility of the merger with the MCR). The
Commission's evaluation is based on a hybrid Article 85/Article 86 test. The Commission
must reach a final decision on the compatibility of a merger (with or without conditions)
with the MCR within a further delay of four months from the date of the initiation of
proceedings. In short, the overall period for a final commission decision is either five months
or five and a half months, depending upon whether the Member State local consideration
procedure is initiated or not.
10. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
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1985 to introduce guidelines for joint ventures11 and redrafting the
previously rather vague and general language in light of the Con-
centrative JV Notice. This article purposefully does not use the
term "new" when referring to the JVG, because there is nothing
new in its substance. Rather, the JVG is a codification of the Com-
mission's case law and administrative practice to date. The JVG
has the merit of providing a quick reference document with general
pointers on how to evaluate a joint venture. But it cannot, and
must not, be used as a substitute for the rigorous case law analysis
which is crucial in determining (a) whether a joint venture is
caught by Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty and (b) whether such a
joint venture is likely to be exempted pursuant to Article 85(3) of
the EEC Treaty. The Commission is itself at pains to repeatedly
underline the need for a case by case approach.12
In view of the above described background to the JVG, this
paper will first address what the JVG does not do, prior to review-
ing the EC competition law framework in which the JVG operates,
and the substance of the JVG itself. The EC's notification and en-
forcement procedures, including its fining policy, are subsequently
explained in more detail. Finally, a few comments are made about
the decentralized application of EC competition law.
II. WHAT THE JVG DOES NOT Do
Long aware that joint ventures had to be examined on a case
by case basis with regard to substantive issues, businessmen and
legal practitioners were nonetheless keen to obtain some proce-
dural legal certainty from the Commission in the JVG. They were
disappointed.
A. No Fixed Response Deadlines
Without doubt, the motivation behind the JVG was the con-
cern over the so-called two-speed competition law for cooperative
and concentrative joint ventures. Initially, the structure of the
JVG was more akin to that of an EC Regulation. In mid-1991, the
Commission's approach was to advocate the same "pre-meeting"
11. Unpublished internal Commission document entitled "Principles governing the as-
sessment of joint ventures under the EC competition rules," IV/471/85-EN.
12. See, for example, JVG paras. 5 & 14.
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procedure for joint ventures as used under the MCRI' in order to
(i) save time, (ii) focus on the relevant information to be requested
(and thereby avoid an incomplete notification which will delay the
running of deadlines), and (iii) hold more ongoing informal discus-
sions and meetings. The impact of this approach was to have
meant that:
(a) Within two to three months of the notification, the Commis-
sion would provide an initial reaction.
(b) After four months, the Commission would have been able to
publish a Notice in the Official Journal, pursuant to Regula-
tion 17,'14 briefly describing the case and offering interested
parties the opportunity to submit written comments within
one month.
(c) Within six months, the Commission would have been in a
position to give approval by means of a "comfort letter."
The Commission considered that there was no need for a for-
mal decision if the joint venture did not raise legal problems. If
problems arose (e.g., because of a complaint by an interested
party), then a formal decision could have been adopted subse-
quently. However, the draft JVG, made public in early 1992, con-
tained only a general reference to procedural deadlines, and even
this disappeared by the time the JVG was adopted.
Despite significant pressure, the Commission once again re-
fused to commit itself to specific deadlines for approving notified
joint ventures. The 1991 draft version' 5 of the JVG was preceded
by a discussion paper which stated that a "self-imposed time limit
for the completion of the various procedures" would be applied.
This would have been a welcome element of legal certainty. How-
ever, the final text of the JVG makes no reference to deadlines.
The nearest the Commission came to such an undertaking are the
various statements of Sir Leon Brittan, the former Commissioner
for Competition, in December 1992 about speeding up competition
law procedures. 16 In summary, within two months from the date of
the complete notification, the Commission services will inform the
parties in writing whether or not the agreement concerned is com-
13. The Merger Task Force encourages parties to hold meetings with them prior to
drafting the Form CO notification so as to ensure that any potentially difficult issues are
identified and addressed, and to avoid giving irrelevant information.
14. See Section VI, infra.
15. IV/647/91-EN.
16. Sir Leon Brittan, The Future of EC Competition Policy (Dec. 7, 1992).
1992-1993]
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patible with EC competition rules. The character of this letter will
vary according to the circumstances of the case: it may be a "com-
fort letter" confirming the compatibility of the agreement with Ar-
ticle 85(1) or (3).1 In other cases, the commission will formally ap-
prove the agreement by announcing a negative clearance or
exemption decision. Where the compatibility of the agreement
with the competition rules is doubtful, the parties will receive a
"warning letter" which will inform them of the Commission's in-
tention to launch an in-depth inquiry with a view to adopting an
exemption or prohibition decision. In all cases where a formal deci-
sion is envisaged, the Commission services will also inform the un-
dertakings concerned in advance of the envisaged final date and of
any modification of it. These constitute purely internal instruc-
tions for the handling of the so-called "structural" cases, and are
not legally binding.
Realistically, the announced timing will be easy to observe if
the joint venture in question does not raise any serious competi-
tion issues or problems and a "comfort letter ' s is deemed appro-
priate. But a "warning letter"'1 signaling serious competition
problems would effectively lead to an open-ended response time.
Yet, it is precisely those cases which merit a warning letter that
require certainty on deadlines. However, this speech is even less
binding on DG IV under the new Commissioner, Mr. Karel van
Miert, than the JVG which takes the form of a Commission No-
tice.20 To be fair, in one recent case,2' the Commission did indicate
that it would give its decision within two months. However, as at
the time of this writing, over two and a half months after the an-
nouncement, nothing has been published.22
17. EEC Treaty, supra not6 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
18. See Section VI, infra.
19. See Section VI, infra.
20. The Commission's Notices, although good indicators of the Commission's position,
are not legally binding (whereas Regulations, Decisions and Directives are), EEC Treaty art.
189.
21. LCD's, a joint venture between Philips Electronics N.V., Thomson Consumer Elec-
tronics S.A. and Sagem which was initially notified as a merger: See Reuters, Jan. 19, 1993.
22. DG IV has not yet set up a systematic procedure for the expedited treatment of
Article 85(3) notifications, either for ordinary cases or structural cases. Presently, a small
working group is in the process of developing a procedure for the structural cases. Such a
procedure would, inter alia, entail the following steps:
Each structural case will receive a numerical code, preceded by the letters "CS" ("Cas
Structurel"), indicating that the case will benefit from the new procedure.
Immediately after notification, a short notice will be published in the EC Official Jour-
nal, analogous to the one published in case of a notified merger. The notice will indicate the
[Vol. 2
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B. No Comments on the Duration of Exemptions
Another of the industry's concerns is the time limits imposed
on the duration of cooperative joint ventures approved under the
Article 85(1)-(3)2" process. These range traditionally between five
and ten years. Fifteen and even twenty year exemptions are
granted in exceptional cases.24 Extensions of the initial exemption
period are possible, but they are entirely at the Commission's dis-
cretion. 5 The JVG is totally silent on this subject. It would have
been more satisfactory to have had a minimum time period of no
less than ten years while recognizing the need for case by case vari-
ations. A period less than this should have required detailed justi-
fication by the EC Commission, as most joint ventures are long
term projects in which the partners invest a substantial amount of
time and money. It is essential that parties making a commercial
decision as to whether they should form a joint venture know in
advance just how long they will be able to cooperate. Accordingly,
the JVG should have contained a set of criteria enabling potential
joint venture partners to determine, in advance and with reasona-
ble certainty, how long their proposed cooperative joint venture is
likely to be exempted. These criteria could have included a recog-
nition that the exemption duration will depend inter alia on:
(i) the size of the investment, so that the joint venture part-
ners are assured that they can earn a reasonable return on
their investment;
(ii) the tax position of the joint venture, so that it can last long
enough to enable the use of loss carry-forwards for early
years;
(iii) the particular joint venture activity, so that, for example,
joint production ventures, can obtain credit for the time it
takes to build a plant and start production; and
(iv) employee concerns, so that joint venture employees can at
least obtain a minimum level of social security benefits.
fact of the notification, the names of the parties, the nature of the operation and the eco-
nomic sectors involved.
Pursuant to the Communication and the announcement made by Sir Leon Brittan in
December, the first stage will end two months after notification.
23. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,47.
24. E.g., Amersham Buchler, 1982 O.J. (L314)34; De Laval/Stork, 1988 O.J. (L59) 32.
25. E.g., De Laval/Stork (No. 2), note 24, supra.
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Ill. THE EC COMPETITION LAW FRAMEWORK
Whereas the MCR combines elements of both Articles 85 and
86 of the EEC Treaty,"6 the JVG focuses on the application of Ar-
ticle 85 to joint ventures. A few comments about Article 85 are
therefore appropriate.
A. General Scope
Article 85(1)27 of the Treaty prohibits certain anti-competitive
practices, and is applicable if four conditions are fulfilled: there
must be an agreement or concerted practice between undertak-
ings2s that restricts competition and affects trade between Member
States,2 9 in an appreciable manner."0
Agreements and concerted practices caught by Article 85(1)s'
are automatically void under Article 85(2)32 of the Treaty, unless
an exemption has been granted by the EC Commission under Arti-
cle 85(3). 1 An exemption is granted either pursuant to an individ-
26. In other words, the MCR enables the Commission to grant an EEC Treaty Article
85(3)-type approval, provided that the merger does not create or strengthen a dominant
position (as per Article 86)which would significantly impede competition in the EC, or a
substantial part of the EC. Unlike Article 86, the MCR does not require "abusive" behavior.
The mere creation or strengthening of the dominant position is enough.
27. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S 11, 47.
28. The terms "agreement" and "undertaking" have been very widely construed by the
ECJ and will, in practice, cover any form of understanding between natural and/or legal
persons. However, according to the ECJ's case law, agreements between a parent and its
subsidiary will generally fall outside Article 85(1). Case 22/71, Bequelin Import v. S.A.G.L
Import Export, 1971 E.C.R. 949. But see Section III (C), infra.
29. Pursuant to the "effects doctrine", the EC Commission applies Article 85(1) to non-
EC entities whose behavior has an impact within the EC (Woodpulp, 1985 O.J. (L85) 1,
later appealed to the ECJ. See, note 42, infra. In the Notice relating to imports of Japanese
goods into the EC, the Commission had already made it clear that measures to restrict
quantities of imports from third countries, or their prices or quality or the like, will be
caught by EEC Treaty art. 85(1) even if the headquarters of the companies involved are
outside the EC; see Section III (B), infra.
30. According to its Notice on agreements of minor importance, the so called de
minimis rule (1986 O.J. (L231) 2), the Commission takes the view that agreements between
undertakings engaged in the production or distribution of goods, or in the provision of ser-
vices generally, do not fall under EEC Treaty art. 85(1) if:
said goods or services do not represent more than 5% of the total market for
such goods or services in the area of the common market affected by the agree-
ment and the aggregate annual turnover of the participating undertakings does
not exceed 200 million ECU (approximately U.S. $245.5 million).
31. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
32. See supra note 31.
33. See Sections V & VI, infra.
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ual.notification of an agreement or pursuant to so-called block ex-
emption regulations which have been adopted and set forth general
exemption criteria for particular categories of agreement e.g., spe-
cialization, research and development, exclusive distribution, and
patent or know-how licensing, 4 or for agreements in a particular
sector e.g., distribution in the motor vehicle sector.3 5
Article 85 (1)36 is widely interpreted by the EC Commission,
with the result that practically all forms of agreements between
firms of a substantial size are caught and should, according to the
Commission's traditional doctrine, be notified for exemption or
structured so as to qualify under an applicable block exemption
regulation. While the Commission tries to discourage corporations
(or their legal advisors) from adopting the "rule of reason" ap-
proach in determining whether Article 85 (1)37 applies to a given
agreement, the Commission accepts that it cannot process all the
notifications it receives for exemption under Article 85(3). 31 Hence,
there is a recent tendency to adopt more block exemption regula-
tions and an attempt to institute less formal approval procedures.
B. Extraterritorial Application of EEC Treaty art. 85(1)
In a Notice concerning Japanese imports, 9 the Commission
emphasized that the fact that "the head offices of several or all the
participant undertakings [in an agreement] are outside the Com-
munity does not prevent EEC Treaty art. 85(1)40 from being ap-
plied, as long as the results of the agreements, decisions or con-
certed practices spread to the territory of the common market". It
is generally accepted that "any agreement which prevents under-
takings in third states from becoming suppliers or competitors
within the Community may fall under Article 85(1)", 41 subject to
the proviso that such effect must be appreciable (i.e., not de
minimis).
Case law has confirmed that agreements producing the requi-
34. See Section V, infra.
35. Regulation No. 123/85, 1985 O.J. (L15) 16.
36. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
37. See supra note 36.
38. See supra, note 36.
39. Commission Notice on Imports into the Community of Japanese Goods, 1972 O.J.
(C111) 13.
40. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
41. Id.; see, e.g., Reuter/BASF, 1976 O.J. (L254) 40.
1992-1993]
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site anti-competitive effect on trade within the EC will fall within
the scope of Article 85(1),42 even where all the parties are situated
abroad and absent any presence or activity in the EC via a related
or subsidiary corporation situated in a Member State.4" In short,
assuming that the other requirements for the application of Article
85(1) 44 are met, its application is not avoided because the head of-
fice and/or the primary activities of one or more of the parties is
situated outside the EC.
C. Application of Article 85(1) to Intra-group Agreements
The ECJ has held that Article 85(1) 45 does not apply to agree-
ments between "undertakings belonging to the same concern and
having the status of parent company and subsidiary, if the under-
takings form an economic unit within which the subsidiary has no
real freedom to determine its course of action on the market, and
if the agreements or practices are concerned merely with the inter-
nal allocation of tasks as between the undertakings" (emphasis
added).46 Therefore, the essential point is the determination of
whether the individual companies retain the possibility of adopting
marketing strategies separate to those laid down by the parent
company. If so, Article 85(1) 47 can apply to relationships between
members of the same group.48
In the case of partly owned subsidiaries, it has been suggested
that the test for the application of Article 85 4 is whether one un-
dertaking has acquired, actually or potentially, control over an-
other undertaking.50 This test would apply irrespective of whether
the shareholding was fifty percent or twenty five percent. It is clear
from the wording of the Complementary Note to Form A/B 51 that
42. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S 11,47.
43. Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116 & 177/85, Woodpulp 1988 E.C.R 5193. Previously,
the Commission had always demonstrated an EC presence by at least one party to such
anti-competitive agreements; e.g., Case 22/71, Bequelin Import v. GL Import Export, 1971
E.C.R 949.
44. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
45. See supra note 44.
46. Case 15/74, Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E.C.R 1147.
47. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
48. Case 30/87, Corine Bodson v. S.A. Pompes Fun~bres des Regions Libfrtes, 1988
E.C.R 2479.
49. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
50. See Bellamy & Child, Common Market Law of Competition, at 129 (3rd ed.).
51. The form used to make an application for a negative clearance and/or notification
for an exemption to the EC Commission. See further Section VI, infra.
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the Commission does not exclude the possibility that a minority
holding may nonetheless confer control (the Commission not only
asks notifying parties to indicate the companies in which more
than fifty percent of the shares is held, but also those companies in
which more than twenty five percent is held).
52
IV. APPLICATION OF EEC TREATY ART. 85 TO JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENTS
A. General Overview
Joint ventures have long been regarded as the chameleons of
EC competition law. Sometimes they are mergers, sometimes not.
To date, cooperative joint ventures (i.e., joint ventures which are
not mergers) have been subject to review by the EC Commission
under Article 8551 of the EEC Treaty as agreements which may
restrict or distort competition. The Commission has taken approxi-
mately one hundred formal decisions since 1968 concerning joint
ventures." Whether the formation of a joint venture amounts to a
restrictive practice and therefore falls within the ambit of Article
85(1) 55 will depend on the particular circumstances of each case. 6
However, the general rule is that any agreement between two or
more enterprises in any form whatsoever under which a third cor-
poration is owned or operated jointly falls under Article 85(1)
5
' of
the Treaty if the agreement has the effect, directly or indirectly,
actually or potentially, of restricting or reducing competition be-
tween the parent companies, or from third parties or with the joint
venture itself.
58
52. 1985 O.J. (L240) 1. This attitude is in fact reflected in the Commission's block ex-
emption regulations where, to be deemed a "connected" company, the issue of control is not
determined by looking at the shareholding in a corporation but rather the ability to directly
or indirectly influence the affairs of such company. See, for example, Commission Regula-
tion 1983/83 art. 4(2), 1983 O.J. (L173) 1, as amended, and Commission Regulation 2349/84
art. 12(1), 1984 O.J. (L219) 15, as amended.
53. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
54. There has been no ECJ judgment in this area. Compare, however, the number of
decisions adopted since 1968, with the approximately fifty concentrative joint venture deci-
sions adopted since September 21, 1990.
55. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
56. The factual situation and not the terminology or legal form adopted will determine
the result. See Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 53, 54 (1977); and JVG para. 4.
57. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
58. SHV/Chevron, 1975 O.J. (L38) 14. The ECJ has stated that even if the particular
clauses of an agreement are not expressly restrictive, the overall effect of the agreement
itself may still be anti-competitive. See Case 56/65, Soci6t6 Technique Mini&re v.
1992-1993]
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In practice, the Commission will take into account all relevant
factors in deciding whether actual or potential competition exists.5
The relevant issues to consider include the amount of the invest-
ment in the joint venture, its production and sales, and the risk
factors involved in establishing the joint venture.60 These consider-
ations are not exhaustive and must be supplemented with a spe-
cific market analysis. Nonetheless, as the Commission's interpreta-
tion of Article 85(1)61 is generally broad, most sizeable joint
ventures are likely to be viewed as caught by the prohibition in
Article 85(1), thereby requiring a notification for an individual
exemption.
62
The Commission determined in GEC/Weir, 3 that "even in the
absence of express provisions, the creation of a joint venture gener-
ally has a notable effect on the conduct of parent parties who have
a significant holding in the joint venture. Within the field of the
joint venture and in related fields such parties are likely to coordi-
nate their conduct and be influenced in what would otherwise have
been their independent decisions and activities". Furthermore, the
Commission has stated that "parent companies will not in general
compete with the activities of joint ventures in which they hold
substantial stakes, even if they are contractually free to do So"1.64
The Commission has looked most favorably upon joint ven-
tures involving technical collaboration which enhances technical
progress in the EC. 5 The Commission's principal concern in such
instances is that the parties to the joint venture should indepen-
dently have access to the results of the joint project, as well as to
the preexisting technology deemed to be indispensable for the ex-
ploitation of the new technology developed by the joint venture.66
Maschinenbau Ulm, 1966 E.C.R 235.
59. Jaz-Peter, 1978 O.J. (L61) 17; see infra note 60, point 55.
60. See further Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, point 55 (1983).
61. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
62. All joint ventures likely to be prohibited by EEC Treaty art. 85(1) need to be noti-
fied to the EC Commission with a request for an individual exemption under Article 85(3)
or, alternatively, a negative clearance indicating that Article 85(1) is not applicable. See
infra Sections V & VI.
63. 1977 O.J. (L327) 26.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., National Coal Board (Bull. EC 5 - 1985, point 2.1.31); BP/Kellogg, 1985
O.J. (L369) 9. Note that the Commission has never prohibited a joint venture involving the
transfer of technology where the parents were not actual competitors. In addition, joint
ventures involving specialization and/or research and development may qualify for a block
exemption under Regulations 417/85 or 418/85, respectively. See infra Section V.
66. De LavaI/Stork (No. 1), 1977 O.J. (L215) 11.
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B. The Substantive Structure of the Joint Venture
Guidelines
The definition of a cooperative joint venture under the JVG is
accomplished by a negative process. Namely, those joint ventures
which are not concentrative joint ventures pursuant to Article 3(2),
para. 2, of the MCR are cooperative, though the JVG admits that
the delimitation between the two "can be difficult in individual
1) 67cases,.
The JVG excludes the application of Article 85(1)68 to joint
ventures between parents within the same group, or which are de
minimis, or which fall within the 1968 Notice on cooperation be-
tween companies."' In all other cooperative joint venture cases, the
application of Article 85(1) 70 has to be appraised by focusing on
the relationship between the parties to the joint venture and on
the effects of their cooperation on third parties. The JVG makes it
clear that the impact of networks of joint ventures can be espe-
cially restrictive of competition.7 1 An appraisal of whether a partic-
ular joint venture restricts competition will address the following
primary issues:
(a) Competition between parent companies
Can the tasks of the joint venture be realistically performed by
67. JVG, para. 10. 'Cooperative joint ventures are those:
whose activities are not to be performed on a lasting basis, especially those lim-
ited in advance by the parents to a short time period,
which do not perform all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, espe-
cially those charged by their parents simply with the operation of particular
functions of an undertaking (partial-function JVs), which perform all the func-
tions of an autonomous economic entity (full-function JVs) where they give rise
to coordination of competitive behavior by the parents in relation to each other
or to the JV.
68. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
69. JVG, para. 15. The 1968 Notice (1968 O.J. (C75) 3, as amended), states that the
types of cooperation referred to in said Notice do not restrict competition because:
they have as their sole objective the procurement of nonconfidential information
and, therefore, serve in the preparation of autonomous decisions of the partici-
pating enterprises;
they have as their sole objective management cooperation;
they have as their sole objective cooperation in fields removed from the market;
they are concerned solely with technical and organizational arrangements;
they concern solely arrangements between non-competitors;
even though they concern arrangements between competitors, they neither limit
the parties' competitive behavior nor affect the market position of third parties.
70. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
71. JVG, paras. 27-31; and Optical Fibres, 1986 O.J. (L236) 30.
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the parents individually?
7 2
(b) Competition between the parent companies and the joint
venture
Will the joint venture (and in particular a full-function joint
venture supplying to, competing with or buying from one or
more parent) result in a division of geographic markets, product
markets or customers?"3
(c) Effects of the joint venture on the position of third parties
Does the creation of a joint venture result in the pooling of mar-
ket power by the parents (e.g., for purchases or sales) which (i)
excludes from the market the parents' traditional suppliers or
customers; (ii) creates a barrier to market entry by potential
competitors or (iii) impedes the growth of the parents' actual
competitors?
74
(d) Assessment of the appreciable effect of restrictions of
competition
The most important questions in this context are:
What are the market shares of the parent companies and the
joint venture, the structure of the relevant market and the de-
gree of concentration in the sector concerned?
What are the economic and financial strengths of the parent
companies, and any commercial or technical edge which they
may have in comparison to their competitors?
72. This was elaborated in the Thirteenth Competition Policy Report, point 55 (1985).
The JVG repeats the criteria:
Contribution to the JV
Does each parent company have sufficient financial resources to carry Out the
planned investment? Does each parent company have sufficient managerial qual-
ifications to run the JV? Does each parent company have access to the necessary
input products?
Production of the JV
Does each parent know the production technique? Does each parent make the
upstream or downstream products himself and does it have access to the neces-
sary production facilities?
Sales of the JV
Is actual or potential demand such as to enable each parent company to manu-
facture the product on its own? Does each parent company have access to the
distribution channel needed to sell the products manufactured by the JV?
Risk factors
Can each parent company on its own bear the technical and financial risks asso-
ciated with the production operations of the JV?
Access to the relevant market
What is the relevant geographic and product market? What are the barriers to
entry into that market? Is each parent company capable of entering that market
on its own? Can each parent overcome existing barriers within a reasonable time
and without undue effort or cost?
73. JVG, paras. 21 & 22.
74. JVG, paras 23-25.
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What is the market proximity of the activities carried out by the
joint venture?
Are the fields of activity of the parent companies and the joint
venture identical or interdependent?
What is the scale and significance of the joint venture's activi-
ties in relation to those of its parents?
To what extent are the arrangements between the firms con-
cerned restrictive?
To what extent is market access by third parties restricted?
7 5
The JVG restates that joint ventures between non-competitors
are not generally problematic from a competition law perspective,
provided that the market access of third parties is not significantly
affected. In this latter regard, attention must be paid particularly
to the upstream or downstream activities of the joint venture in
relation to its parents. 6 Conversely, joint ventures between com-
petitors will invariably lead to an interplay between the activities
of the joint venture and its parents.7 7 While each case must be as-
sessed on the basis of its own facts, the following different situa-
tions are identified by the JVG:
7 8
Where the joint venture operates on the same market as its
parents, the normal consequence is that competition between all
participating undertakings will be restricted.
Where the joint venture operates on a market upstream or
downstream to that of the parents with which it has supply or de-
livery links, the effects on competition will be the same as in the
case of a production joint venture.
Where the joint venture operates on a market adjacent to that
of its parents, competition can only be restricted when there is a
high degree of interdependence between the two markets. This is
especially the case when the joint venture manufactures products
which are complementary to those of its parents.
C. Ancillary Restrictions
The JVG adopts the language of the MCR and distinguishes
between the restrictions inherent in the creation and operation of a
75. JVG, para. 26.
76. JVG, paras. 32-35.
77. JVG, para. 36. JVG Paras. 37-40 give, respectively, examples of restrictions in joint
ventures for R&D, sales, purchasing and manufacturing inputs for the parents.
78. JVG, para. 41.
1992-1993]
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
joint venture, and restrictions in additional agreements. These ad-
ditional agreements are said to be directly related to and neces-
sary79 for the establishment and the operation of the joint venture
if their absence would jeopardize its existence. Such agreements
are deemed to be ancillary to the joint venture and subordinate to
its main objectives.8 0 According to the JVG, s1 if a joint venture
does not fall within the scope of Article 85(1),2 then neither do
any additional agreements which, while restricting competition on
their own, are ancillary to the joint venture in the manner de-
scribed above. Conversely, if a joint venture falls within the scope
of Article 85(1),"' then so will any ancillary restrictions. The ex-
emption from prohibition is based for both on the same principles.
Ancillary restrictions require no special justification under Article
85(3)."' They will generally be exempted for the same period as the
joint venture. Additional agreements which are not ancillary to the
joint venture normally fall within the scope of Article 85(1), s" even
though the joint venture itself may not. In order for them to be
granted an exemption under Article 85(3),86 a specific assessment
of their benefits and disadvantages must be made. This assessment
must be carried out separately from that of the joint venture.
Examples of ancillary restrictions include obligations on the
joint venture to observe a specific product range, to locate produc-
tion in a particular place, not to manufacture or market products
competing with those of the parents (especially in cases of technol-
ogy transfer), or to purchase from or supply to its parents.8 7 Fur-
ther examples are restrictions on the parents from competing with
the joint venture in its area of activity (at least during the start-up
phase)."8
79. The duration, subject matter and territorial scope of such agreements should not
exceed the requirements of the joint venture.
80. JVG, paras. 65 & 66.
81. JVG, paras. 67 & 68.
82. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
83. See supra note 82.
84. See supra note 82.
85. See supra note 82.
86. See supra note 82.
87. JVG, pares. 70-74.
88. JVG, paras. 75-76.
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V. EXEMPTIONS UNDER EEC TREATY ART. 85(3) FOR JOINT
VENTURES
Only the EC Commission has the authority to grant exemp-
tions under Article 85(3).89 Agreements prohibited by Article
85(1)90 may be exempted from this prohibition by the Commission
if the four cumulative conditions of Article 85(3)91 are met. An
agreement may be exempted if:
it contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress;
it allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit;
it imposes on the parties concerned only restrictions which are
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
and it does not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question.
The Commission may grant an exemption either by individual
decision, regarding a particular agreement, or by regulation, cover-
ing an entire category of similar agreements.9 2 There are a number
of block exemption regulations which are of special significance to
joint ventures, as discussed below in this Section.
The JVG adopts the above criteria, and specifies that the Reg-
ulation 17 notification system will continue to apply to cooperative
joint ventures.9 3 In assessing a joint venture under the above crite-
ria, the Commission will determine whether the joint venture
brings appreciable objective, advantages for third parties (espe-
cially consumers) which counterbalance the detriment to competi-
tion.94 The stronger the position of the parents (as regards finan-
cial power and market share, for example), the more rigorous the
89. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
90. See supra note 89.
91. See supra note 89.
92. As already mentioned in Section III, supra, the Commission has used its regulatory
powers to adopt so called "block-exemptions" for exclusive distribution agreements (note
37, supra), exclusive purchasing agreements (1983 0. J. (L173) 5, as amended), patent li-
censing agreements (note 52, supra), specialization agreements (1985 0. J. (L53) 1), research
and development agreements (1985 0. J. (L53) 5), and know-how licensing agreements (1989
0. J. (L61) 1).
93. Except for those in the rail, road and inland waterway, maritime and air transport
sectors to which, respectively, Regulations 1017/68 (1968 J. 0. (L175) 10), 4056/86 (1986 0.
J. (L378) 4), and 3975/87 (1987 0. J. (L374) 1) apply, containing provisions similar to those
of Regulation 17.
94. JVG, para. 54.
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examination which the joint venture will receive."" The Commis-
sion will seek to establish whether the contractual restriction on
the parties' economic freedom is (a) directly connected with the
creation of the joint venture, and (b) indispensable for its exis-
tence.9 6 Hence, the development of new or improved products or
processes, or the opening up of new markets, are considered as be-
ing pro-competitive. In contrast, joint price fixing, reduction of
production and sales will be treated as classic anti-competitive car-
tels. 7 The Commission will also look unfavorably on joint venture
agreements which consolidate or strengthen a dominant position. 8
The JVG does confirm that "rationalization" joint ventures adapt-
ing supply to shrinking or stagnant demand will still be able to
obtain Article 85(3) 99 exemptions, but only if they "serve to over-
come a structural crisis, to accelerate the removal of unprofitable
production capacity from the market and thereby to reestablish
competition in the medium term (sic)". 10° The Commission sees
the foregoing benefits as compensating for the inevitable price in-
creases resulting from such "crisis cartels". 10'
A large number of the earlier joint venture exemptions, until
March 1, 1985, concerned specialization and/or R&D agree-
ments.102 In order to help ease the exemption process for such
agreements, the Commission adopted two block exemption Regula-
tions, 417/85103 for specialization and 418/85104 for R&D arrange-
ments. These Regulations were not, however, much used, due to
the various strict qualifying condition contained therein. In fact,
only small scale specialization and/or R&D joint ventures could
95. JVG, para. 57.
96. JVG, para. 58.
97. JVG, paras. 55 & 56.
98. JVG, para. 58. This echoes the language of the MCR somewhat. See note 26, supra.
See also note 162, infra.
99. EEC Tregty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
100. JVG, para. 55.
101. There were numerous crisis cartel joint venture exemptions in the early 1980's in
particular in the petrochemical sector (e.g., Shell/Akzo (Rovin), 1983 0. J. (295) 7; PRB/
Shell, 1984 0. J. (C189) 2, and BPCL/ICI, 1984 0. J. (L212) 1). Subsequently, crisis cartels
fell out of favor, though under the current economic climate, and with a new Commissioner
for Competition, Mr. Karel van Miert, who has espoused a more "industrial policy" ap-
proach to competition law than his two immediate predecessors, it would not be surprising
to see more "crisis cartel" joint venture exemptions.
102. E.g., Jaz/Peter No. 1, 1969 J. 0. (L 195) 5; Clima Chappee-Buderus, 1969 J. 0.
(L195) 1; Henkel/Colgate, 1972 J. 0. (L14) 14, etc.
103. 1984 0. J. (L53) 1.
104. 1984 0. J. (L53) 5.
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benefit from Regulations 417/8505 and 418/85.108 In tandem with
the JVG, the Commission also adopted Regulation 151/93107
amending the foregoing Regulations, as well as Regulations
2349/84108 and 556/89109 on patent and know-how licensing, respec-
tively. These regulations also enhance the development, improve-
ment and transfer of technology. The stated purpose of these vari-
ous amendments was to render the said block exemptions more
usable in the context of joint ventures. While a fuller review of
Regulations 417/85110 and 418/85111 falls outside the scope of this
paper, it is pertinent to note that larger joint ventures are still
likely to be excluded by the relatively low market share criteria.
112
However, Regulations 2349/84113 and 556/89114 have been positively
modified to allow vertical licensing between a joint venture and its
parents; 15 this is a welcome development. The Commission will
definitely maintain its practice of imposing conditions when ex-
empting a joint venture. Such conditions range from regular re-
porting requirements to modification of the agreements, to out-
right divestiture.1
6
VI. THE EC NOTIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
Given that cooperative joint ventures subject to Article
85(1) 1" still require individual exemption pursuant to Article
85(3),118 this Section sets forth the relevant procedural rules, as
well as the pros and cons of the notification process. In particular,
the impact of Sir Leon Brittan's December 1992 statements on the
informal approval mechanisms are also considered.
105. See supra note 103.
106. See supra note 104.
107. 1993 0. J. (L21) 8.
108. See supra note 59.
109. 1989 O.J. (L61) 1.
110. See supra note 103.
111. See supra note 104.
112. See respectively, Article 1 of Regulation 151/93 as regards Regulation 417/85, and
Article 2 of Regulation 151/93 as regards Regulation 418/85.
113. See supra note 59.
114. See supra note 109.
115. Regulation 151/93, Articles 3 and 4, respectively.
116. E.g., Continental/Michelin, 1988 0. J. (L305) 33; UIP, 1989 0. J. (L226) 25;
Procter & Gamble, see infra note 162.
117. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
118. See supra note 117.
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A. Formal Notification Procedures under Regulation 17
The formal EC approval procedure (commonly called a notifi-
cation) is governed primarily by Regulation 17.119 A notification to
the Commission has two aims. First, one may seek an official ruling
that an agreement does not come within the terms of Article
85(1)120 of the Treaty at all (this is called a negative clearance).
Second, and without prejudice to a concurrent application for a
negative clearance, and purely as a precaution only, the same noti-
fication may submit that the agreement may fall within the prohi-
bition in Article 85(1),121 but will provide reasons as to why the
provisions of Article 85(1)122 should be declared inapplicable to the
agreement by virtue of Article 85(3)123 (this is called an exemp-
tion). Strictly speaking, one makes an "application" for negative
clearance and a "notification" for exemption. In practice, the same
term, notification, is used for both the application and notification
procedures and normally the request is made in the alternative. It
is possible to ask for negative clearance (but not an exemption) in
relation to the applicability of Article 86 of the Treaty.
Applications for negative clearance (for both Articles 85 and
86) and notifications for exemption (for Article 85) are made using
a so-called "Form A/B" and the accompanying Complementary
Note, which provides guidance on how to complete Form A/B. Par-
ties usually lodge Form A/B with the Commission together with
additional documentation in the form of exhibits containing a full
statement of the facts and reasoning relevant to the notification. 124
Incorrect or misleading information may attract procedural
fines.125
If the Commission objects to any matters notified, then it
119. 1962 J. 0. (204) 13, as amended.
120. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47.
121. See supra note 120.
122. See supra note 120.
123. See supra note 120.
124. It is important to make proper use of Form A/B for the notification of all or part
of an agreement, as opposed to attaching the Form as a mere "cover letter" to an agreement
(Joined Cases 209-215 and 218/78, FEDETAB, 1980 E.C.R 3125; Case 30/78, Distillers v.
Commission, 1980 E.C.R 2229; and Case 106/79, VBBB v. Eldi Records, 1980 E.C.R 1137).
However, while the notifying parties have a duty to appraise the Commission of all relevant
facts, the Commission must also independently evaluate the notified arrangements (Joined
Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R 299).
125. Regulation 17, art. 15(1). Such procedural fines are much less than the fines for
substantive infringements; see also Nat'l Panasonic France S.A., 1982 J. 0. (L211) 32.
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must serve a notice of objection on the parties and give them the
opportunity to respond to the Commission's concerns, questions or
objections. Before deciding whether to grant a formal negative
clearance or an exemption, the Commission is obliged to publish a
summary of the relevant application in the official Journal of the
EC and to invite all interested third parties to submit their obser-
vations within a specified time limit which must not be less than
one month. Such publication must have "regard to the legitimate
interest of undertakings in the protection of their business
secrets".' 26
There is no deadline by which a request for exemption must
be made, but the major advantage of notification-immunity from
substantive fines-arises only upon actual notification, as noted be-
low. However, where the Commission decides to grant an exemp-
tion, this may be retroactive to the date of notification. The Com-
mission may also impose conditions or obligations upon the
granting of an exemption, provided that the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard.
(a) Advantages of Notification
One of the most important legal benefits of notification is that
the validity of an agreement will not be in jeopardy once a negative
clearance or an exemption has been granted. Such an agreement
may be enforced in the national courts. This is particularly impor-
tant where valuable patents, know-how and other technical infor-
mation is concerned.
Equally important is that, once an agreement has been noti-
fied, the Commission cannot impose fines for infringements of Ar-
ticle 85(1)127 which take place after notification and before a deci-
sion pursuant to Article 85(3 )128 is taken, provided that such
infringements "fall within the limits of the activity as described in
the notification".'29 Thus, from the moment of notification, there is
immunity from fines, unless the Commission has informed the. par-
ties that "after a preliminary examination it is of the opinion that
Article 85(1) of the Treaty applies and that application of Article
126. Regulation 17, art. 19(3).
127. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S 11,47.
128. See supra note 127. Such a decision may be one granting or refusing exemption; it
will be pursuant to Article 85(3) in either case.
129. Regulation 17, art. 15(5)(a).
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85(3) is not justified" 30 An application for negative clearance only
does not confer immunity from fines. This is why it has become
customary for a joint application and notification to be made for
negative clearance and exemption.
Finally, notification may serve to establish a party's bona
fides,' 3 ' and offer the Commission a valuable alternative interpre-
tation if the agreement should ever be the subject of a com-
plaint. 3 2 This is an approach to bear in mind should a great deal
of publicity attach to an agreement.
(b) Disadvantages of Notification
The major disadvantages of a notification are the risk of pub-
licity and the possibility that the Commission may use the oppor-
tunity to formulate additional competition policy in the area
presented by the notified agreement. Assuming that the agreement
is contrary to Article 85(1), 'e the Commission could, furthermore,
require that certain terms of the agreement be struck out or modi-
fied prior to granting an exemption under Article 85(3). s4
B. Informal Approval Procedure
The Commission issues only about a dozen formal substantive
decisions'3 5 every year. Therefore, an informal settlement proce-
dure has evolved so that a larger number of cases can be settled by
administrative letters, commonly referred to as "comfort letters".
Such letters were initially used only in cases which qualified for a
negative clearance. They have since been employed in cases techni-
cally meriting an individual exemption, and where either the Com-
mission does not consider it necessary to adopt, or the parties indi-
cate that they do not require, a formal exemption decision.
According to the Commission, "although this procedure is less well
known and has less legal value (emphasis added) than a formal
130. Id., Art. 15(6).
131. J. Temple Lang, EEC Competition Policies: A Status Report, in Enterprise Law
of the 80's, at 38 (1980).
132. Such a complaint may be instigated by the Commission itself, by a Member State,
by a party to the agreement or by "interested" third parties (Regulation 17, art. 19).
133. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S 11, 47.
134. See supra note 133.
135. As distinct from procedural decisions requiring information or ordering investiga-
tions and so forth.
112 [Vol. 2
EC JOINT VENTURE GUIDELINES
decision, its importance should not be underestimated, as it en-
ables some cases to be settled with a minimum of administrative
intervention". 131
Comfort letters are not binding upon the Commission,"37 and
Notices under Article 19(3) of Regulation 17 clearly indicate that
the issuance of a comfort letter is "without prejudice to subsequent
proceedings". 38 A fortiori, a comfort letter is not binding on na-
tional courts."3 9 Nor would a comfort letter actually prevent a
party to the agreement from claiming that such agreement was
prohibited by Article 85(1).14o Moreover, the informal nature of the
comfort letter procedure is no guarantee against publicity. In fact,
the Commission's practice is to publish a Notice in order to give
interested third parties the opportunity to submit comments prior
to the issuing of a comfort letter.14 1 However, the lack of legal cer-
tainty mentioned above may remain even where publication takes
place. Thus, the disadvantages of notification are incurred, without
benefitting from the legal certainty of a formal decision. Not all
comfort letters are actually published, however.
142
Sir Leon Brittan's statements seek to give added legal cer-
tainty to comfort letters, while at the same time repeating that
they are not legally binding. Such statements do not have the force
of law and cannot modify the legal position of comfort letters as
discussed above. The welcome signal being given is that the Com-
mission will attach more weight to comfort letters in the future.
But as against third parties, the comfort letter retains its previous
legal weakness, as already highlighted. It is "neat" to view the
warning letter as the opposite of the comfort letter, but the latter's
effect continues in time, whereas the effect of warning letters is of
136. Fifth Report on Competition Policy, p. 9 (1975).
137. Case 71/74, FRUBO v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R 563.
138. Rovin, and BPCL/ICI, note 101, supra.
139. "[A comfort letter is] based only upon the facts in the Commission's possession,
and which reflects the Commission's assessment and brings to an end the procedure of ex-
amination by the department of the Commission responsible for this; a comfort letter does
not have the effect of preventing national courts before which the agreements in question
are alleged to be incompatible with Article 85 from reaching a different finding as regards
the agreements concerned on the basis of the information available to them. Whilst it does
not bind the national courts, the opinion transmitted in such letters nevertheless constitutes
a factor which the national courts may take into account in examining whether the agree-
ments or conduct in question are in accordance with the provisions of Article 85" ( Joined
Cases 253/78, 1-3, 37 and 99/79, Perfume Cases, 1980 E.C.R 2511).
140. Case 59/77, De Bloos v. Bouver, 1977 E.C.R 2359.
141. Rovin and BPCL/ICI, note 101 supra.
142. See Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, point 5 (1981).
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limited duration, being only one of a number of procedural step.
C. Enforcement Procedures and Fines
In addition to the various powers granted to the Commission
regarding the approval or prohibition of restrictive agreements,
Regulation 17 provides the Commission with an impressive array
of powers relating to the enforcement of Articles 85 and 86. In par-
ticular, the Commission may request information by letter,143 con-
duct inquiries into sectors of the economy,'4 request the authori-
ties of the Member States to conduct investigations 14  or
investigate a case itself.
1 46
Agreements or concerted practices contrary to Article 85(1), 4
unless specifically exempted by the Commission, and forms of be-
havior prohibited by Article 86, will be subject to fines, pursuant to
Regulation 17.148 It is evident that companies infringing the EC's
competition rules will be punished increasingly severely in future.
The EC Commission has plainly stated that in areas where the law
is well-established, it will impose much heavier -not to say draco-
nian- fines than in situations where reasonable doubts exist as to
the actual legal position.1
49
The Commission does, however, take account of a party's co-
operative attitude in fixing fines, and may well reduce otherwise
severe fines in view of such cooperation.1
5 0
143. Regulation 17, art. 11, 1959-1962 0. J. Spec. Ed. 87.
144. Id., art. 12.
145. Id., art. 13.
146. Id., art. 14.
147. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S 11, 47.
148. Regulation 17, Article 15(2) provides that the Commission may impose fines of
1,000 ECU (approximately U.S. $1,227) to 1,000,000 ECU (approximately U.S. $1,227,580)
or a greater sum of up to 10 percent of the preceding year's turnover of each company
involved. 1959-1962 0. J. Spec. Ed. 87.
149. For example, the zinc producers in Rio Tinto Zinc, 1984 0. J. (L220) 27 were fined
a total of 3.35 million ECU (approximately U.S. $4,112,393). Fines of approximately 10 mil-
lion ECU (approximately U.S. $12,275,800) are now not uncommon: see: e.g., Peroxygen
Cartel, 1985 0. J. (L35) 1. More recently, much heavier total fines have been imposed in Re:
Polypropylene Cartel, 1986 0. J. (L230) 1 totaling 57.85 million ECU (approximately U.S.
$71, 015, 503) ; Tetra Pak, 1992 0. J. (L72) 1 imposed a fine of 75 million ECU (approxi-
mately US $92 million) on a single non-EC company.
150. E.g., National Panasonic, 1982 0. J. (L354) 28; British Sugar/Napier Brown, 1988
0. J. (L284) 41; and Viho/Toshiba, 1991 0. J. (L287) 39.
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VII. THE DECENTRALIZED APPLICATION OF EC COMPETITION LAW
This issue is relevant to a consideration of cooperative joint
ventures because, unlike the MCR, the JVG does not purport to
establish a one-stop-shop for qualifying arrangements.
A. General
Apart from the competition law formulated and applied at the
EC level, certain EC Member States (e.g., France, Germany and
the United Kingdom) have enacted detailed and extensive statutes
governing restrictive practices affecting their national territories.
Pursuant to existing EC case law discussed below, such national
competition laws may be applied even if EEC Treaty arts. 85 or 86
were to be applicable to a particular agreement or practice. For
example, the Bundeskartellamt can lawfully investigate a possible
infringement under the relevant German statutes, notwithstanding
the existence of an investigation being undertaken by the EC Com-
mission. However, the national authorities have traditionally made
sure that parallel investigations are not conducted. In practice, the
notification of an agreement to the EC Commission will often have
the effect of temporarily suspending the examination of the same
file by the national competition authority.
Despite a theoretically clear demarcation between the jurisdic-
tions of the national authorities and the Commission, the issue of
the compatibility between national antitrust law and EC competi-
tion law remains at times difficult. The issue must be dealt with on
a case by case basis, in view of all the relevant facts. But it is defi-
nite that the Commission's intent is to ensure that (a) national an-
titrust authorities/courts take more account of EC competition
rules, and (b) cooperate with the Commission to guarantee a uni-
form application of Articles 85 and 86 at the national level.151 The
general approach of the Commission is to enlist the aid of national
authorities or courts in applying EC competition law where that
law is settled (either in the form of block exemption regulations or
individual decisions). However, the Commission does not want na-
tional courts to "make" EC competition law and has certainly not
abandoned its exclusive right to apply Article 85(3).152
151. See, EC Commission Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Com-
mission in applying EEC Treaty arts. 85 and 86, 1993 0. J. (Q39) 6.
152. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S 11, 47.
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B. The Case Law
In the leading case of Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamtl53
the ECJ clearly confirmed the coexistence of Community law and
national laws on competition. At that time, the ECJ rejected the
argument that Community competition law might in some respects
be exclusive (subject always to the Commission's exclusive author-
ity to grant Article 85(3) exemptions, presently to the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the Commission in mergers falling with the MCR).
However, the ECJ went on to clarify that the parallel application
of national law would only be permissible to the extent that it does
not prejudice the full and uniform application of Community law
or the effects of measures taken or to be taken to implement it.
This principle was repeated in the Perfume cases,'15 discussed fur-
ther below. In practice, the interrelationship of national and EC
competition laws must be considered in three distinct factual
contexts.
(a) Agreements Prohibited Under EC Law
The Walt Wilhelm 155 case held that an agreement may be the
subject of prohibitions under both Community and national laws.
The application of the prohibition in Article 85(1) 156 of the EEC
Treaty does not mean that the agreement escapes a national prohi-
bition (or a fine or other penalty).
(b) Agreements Outside the Scope of EEC Treaty arts.
85 and 86
Where EC competition law does not apply to agreements,
there can be no conflict with national law, the full force of which
will apply. For example, an agreement too minor to be caught by
Article 85(1),'15 because of the de minimis rule, 158 would not es-
cape the application of a particular national law which does not
have the equivalent of the de minimis rule.
153. Case 14/68, 1969 E.C.R 1.
154. Joined Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, Procureur de la Republique v. Giry and Guerlain
S.A., 1980 E.C.R 2327.
155. See supra note 153.
156. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S 11, 47.
157. See supra note 156.
158. See supra note 30.
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(c) Agreements Exempted Under EC Competition Law
The problematic and critical case is where an agreement
caught by EC Treaty Article 85(1) 15' has been granted an exemp-
tion, either individually by a decision, or through a block exemp-
tion regulation, by the EC Commission pursuant to Article 85(3).160
The matter is still somewhat uncertain, with two opposing schools
of thought. One school argues that the "double barrier" of both EC
and national competition law must be overcome. The other view
holds that an EC exemption prevents the application of national
competition law.
161
The EC Commission itself was initially hesitant on this ques-
tion, commenting as follows on the Walt Wilhelm" 2 case at para-
graph 45 of its Fourth Report on Competition Policy (1974):
"The Court's judgment... leaves open the question whether
the primacy of Community exemptions constitutes a strict rule,
or whether it should be regarded rather as a flexible principle in
the application of which it is permissible to take account of the
respective interests of the Community and of Member
States.' 16
3
The Commission's current position has, however, become more
aggressive in defense of the effect of EC Commission exemptions.
Only shortly before the political compromises alluded to above
were discussed, the Commission re-evaluated its position, stating
that individual and block exemptions constitute "the only Com-
mission measures which prevent the application of domestic com-
159. See supra note 156.
160. See supra note 156.
161. But not normal matters of contract law governing such things as capacity to con-
tract, legality and the like.
162. See supra note 153.
163. Advocates of the double barrier theory also point to more permissive aspects of
certain block exemption regulations which have legitimate and more restrictive national
counterparts. For example:
(a) Regulation 123/85, (note 35, supra) on motor vehicle distribution and servic-
ing expressly states that it is without prejudice to more rigorous national
prohibitions. (Note, however, that the motor vehicle distribution market has
unique political and industrial aspects.)
(b) Regulation 1984/83 (note 59, supra) on exclusive purchasing agreements has
a longer tie-in clause (ten years) for brewery contracts, whereas a shorter
(five years) duration is more common in some countries. The same is true for
petrol and service stations. Again, this Regulation was subject to highly po-
litical debate at the time of adoption, and there was a degree of political
compromise.
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petition law where this would have the effect of prohibiting or an-
nulling an agreement exempted under Article 85(3). T6
The Commission's more robust attitude is based on the judg-
ment in the Perfume165 cases, where the ECJ stated:
"However, in the above mentioned judgment (Walt Wilhelm)
the Court stressed that parallel application of national competi-
tion law can only be permitted in so far as it does not prejudice
the uniform application, throughout the common market, of the
Community rules on cartels or the full effects of the measures
adopted in implementation of those rules. In that regard, it has
been claimed [by the Commission] that the application of na-
tional competition law may not be permitted where it would re-
sult in an exemption granted by a decision or a block exemption
being called in question. It follows, however, from the observa-
tions set forth above that the agreements which form the sub-
ject-matter of the present cases do not benefit from any decision
in application of Article 85(3). Moreover, it is not in dispute that
the agreements concerned do not come within the scope of any
regulation granting a block exemption."
The ECJ unfortunately avoided tackling the effect of exemp-
tions because the agreements concerned in the case were not the
subject of an individual or block exemption. However, the most re-
cent example of the Commission's position is made clear in the
MCR where, subject to the limited exception in Article 9 of the
MCR, EC jurisdiction is exclusive.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Will the JVG actually modify one's approach in the legal anal-
ysis of a cooperative joint venture? This author doubts it: the truly
major shift in this area of the law (i.e., having to make the concen-
trative v. cooperative joint venture evaluation) came earlier with
the adoption of the MCR. Practically speaking, it is a lot less (pro-
cedurally) burdensome to qualify as a concentrative joint venture
than a cooperative one. Many companies bear this in mind when
drafting their contracts, though the Commission may not always
agree.' e
164. Commissioner Andriessen's reply of February 22, 1982, to Written Question No.
1508/81, 1982 0. J. (C85) 6.
165. See supra note 154.
166. See, e.g., Press Release, Procter & Gamble/Finaf, Oct. 18, 1991, (IP (91) 929).
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From a business perspective, the "raison d'etre" of the JVG
has always been procedural. In this regard, the Commission has
kept its options open. The "comfort letter" has seen the birth of
its apparent opposite, the "warning letter". This "innovation" is
only a catchy term for what the Commission was already doing in
practice. It also lacks the long-term effect of a comfort letter. The
single most important issue, therefore, was and remains the Com-
mission's ability to speed up the exemption procedures. The Com-
mission's informal statement in December 1992 undertaking to
give an indication of where a case stands within a two month time
frame should certainly be applauded. If observed, this will be help-
ful; but it is not a dramatic move, since it is an inevitable conse-
quence of the successful implementation of the MCR. Moreover, it
was already the practice of parties in joint venture cases perceived
from the outset as being difficult to engage in pre-notification
meetings with the Commission to discuss the joint venture, prior to
filing Form A/B. This practice has gained additional favor since
the adoption of the MCR, where tight deadlines have made it es-
sential that any questions are ironed out before the notification is
filed (so that an "incomplete" filing does not prevent the deadlines
from starting to run). Hence, even in the traditional cooperative
joint venture context, the parties had a fairly good idea of where
they stood early in the process.
Nonetheless, all of this has not been a waste of time. The
Commission has at least gone on record with its intentions for
streamlining and improving the procedures, and administrative
changes are being considered. Such internal housekeeping was long
overdue. As for the JVG, its very existence will save money for
corporations. The JVG sets forth a general overview of the Com-
mission's practice in a public document. Companies will no longer
have to pay outside lawyers handsome fees for a memorandum
describing the same thing. Moreover, if (as one suspects) the JVG
will have the additional role of an in-house guide for the Commis-
sion's competition services, parties to a notified joint venture will
have the advantage of starting their evaluation from more or less
the same base as DG IV. At last, and as the JVG does not hesitate
to repeat, the joint venture parties and their legal counsel can con-
centrate on the specific facts of the joint venture at hand. This
Originally notified as a merger of certain businesses in Italy, Portugal and Spain, the Com-
mission determined that the case in fact was a cooperative joint venture. Considerable di-
vestiture to reduce the joint ventures market share was required.
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should result in a more meticulous analysis of the application of
the existing case law to the particular facts, rather than getting
bogged down in generalities.
